

Everyday Walks in a French Urban Housing Project

STEP BY STEP

JEAN-FRANÇOIS AUGOYARD

Foreword by Françoise Choay

Translated and with an Afterword by David Ames Curtis

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Afterword

Walking Together, Three Decades Later

DAVID AMES CURTIS

To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always *speaks,* and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie, or a river is.

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*

But the thing is not really *observable*—there is always a skipping over *[enjambement]* in every observation, one is never at the thing itself.

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*

I wanted you. And I was looking for you.
I wanted you. And I was looking for you all day.

But I couldn't find you. I couldn't find you.
You're walking. And you don't always realize it.
But you're always falling.
With each step, you fall forward slightly.
And then catch yourself from falling.

Over and over, you're falling.
And then catching yourself from falling.
And this is how you can be walking and falling
At the same time.

—Laurie Anderson, "Walking and Falling," *Big Science*

On a bright and brisk late September day in 2004, a quarter-century after he had featured the site in his book *Pas à pas,* Jean-François Augoyard kindly offered me a tour of the Arlequin "new town" on the outskirts of his hometown of Grenoble. Having translated this book over the preceding months, I had already shaped in my mind a picture of this fascinating housing complex, about which you have read here. My preformed image of the site—an outgrowth of my act of translation—began to be confronted by another reality, the one formed as we strolled the grounds. Augoyard pointed out, off in the distance, the three main mountain ranges surrounding Grenoble, which I had known previously as the settings for Jean-Claude Killy's 1968 Olympic exploits. Now, climbing one of the three "mounds" (artificial hillocks) described in his book, I realized for the first time how the planners perhaps had fabricated them to mimic visually and physically the environing landscape, with its high peaks—a contextual point not brought out in *Pas à pas*. But as I struggled up a slope, I had to contend not only with the (mild) difficulty of the ascent but also with how that ascent differed from how I had imagined it, each step unsure as I set one foot after the other on an anticipated but unaccustomed slant, the path being more a synthetic version of the winding Heidelbergian *Philosophenweg* than steps up a Mayan temple mount as I had fancied. Words like *lake* did not answer to my promenade past the small but not negligible man-made expanse of water set before me but rather troubled my vision and slowed my pace; and neither did the "silos" for cars, when I passed by, appear as crushingly high above my slightly bowed head as I had envisioned them in my translation, even though I already knew from the book that these and other ersatz terms devised by planners were surely *misleading*. Once we arrived at the "gallery" of this housing complex on International Style stilts,[1] I was surprised to find in the fresh breezes how open and airy it seemed in comparison with the overhang of the impression I was under until then. We never attempted what I had expected would be an infernal rise in one of the complex's reputedly treacherous elevators, but when we did go up an apartment building stairwell, the "passageway" on the mezzanine level that opened out before me set me off balance as

it seemed more luminous and less hazardous than I had thought it would be. Finally, I was stopped in my tracks by what was *not* there; the "Maison du quartier," whose name I was still unsure of in translation, no longer existed as it had three decades before, being the casualty, in the interim, of reconstruction plans and right-wing budget cuts about which Augoyard filled me in. I stood looking at the built configuration that now stands in its place, but looking for what could only be sketched out vaguely for me by a few choppy waves of the author's arms as I sought to transform these rough gestures into a satisfactory translation of a now-departed construction-function: "Community Center."[2] Just as I had laboriously retraced the steps of *Pas à pas* in translating the book, carefully attempting to set my own "wordprints" into each of the writer's own and thereby hoping to re-create the same gait, make the same impressions, achieve the same depth, disturbing neither their sense of flow nor their appearance and yet finding myself trudging over markedly different linguistic ground while attempting to do so, so did I proceed hesitantly, almost trippingly, over an imagined yet physically real builtscape I was now traversing unsteadily for the first time and yet had seen rather clearly in my mind's eye for several months.

Whether he considers himself a great artist, a moonlighting writer,[3] an occasional dabbler, a yeoman in the field, a proletarianized intellectual, or a temporary wetware replacement for the future universal translation machine, the human translator is always faced with *choices*—pretty much all of them imperfect and not fully satisfactory. These choices are not only about the selection of individual words or phrases but also regarding the personality and voice of the author one is translating: his vocabulary, phrasing, tone, pacing, and, last but not least, his background.

In the case of *Pas à pas,* the question of background is a particularly rich and varied one, retrospectively quite challenging to catch sight of in its breadth, for large swaths of postwar French intellectual history (such as that of urban studies, linguistics, rhetoric, and Structuralism, as well as of such thinkers as the existential phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty,[4] the Marxist urbanist Henri Lefebvre,[5] the deconstructionist

Jacques Derrida, and the philosopher of expression Gilles Deleuze),[6] along with foreign influences and prewar precursors (the ontological phenomenologist Martin Heidegger and his student, the Freudo-Marxist critic of modern technology Herbert Marcuse—as Françoise Choay rightly notes in her introduction—along with the creator of modern linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure), definitely come into play.[7] Like the rhapsode Ion in the eponymous dialogue written by Plato, the translator must not only give the distinct impression of, but also endeavor as much as possible to achieve in fact,[8] a complete understanding of the text under interpretation as well as of what the author of the text himself knew and was thinking about—all of this rendered, however, in a context one step removed from the original linguistic setting.[9]

Now, such choices concerning *influences*—one's understanding of what other discourses are also speaking through the text—also involve *decisions* on the translator's part: determinations as to how and to what extent additional voices intrude upon, harmonize with, or simply accompany the author's own as well as proposed solutions as to how to give voice to them in another tongue. To take an illustrative example, Heidegger—author of "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" (in English: "Building, Dwelling, Thinking")—certainly seemed to me, as he did to Choay, a key reference for Augoyard, who himself cites a passage from *Being and Time* about the temporal manners in which "Dasein goes along its ways." Should Heidegger be deemed such an important influence that a major term in the book, *habiter,* must be translated as "dwelling" (*habiter* is indeed the term found in the French translation of Heidegger: "Bâtir, habiter, penser")?[10] Besides the fact that such expressions as "dweller rhetoric" and "dweller expression" would seem even more clumsy than the distinctive ones ultimately chosen—"inhabitant rhetoric" and "inhabitant expression" for the key terms *la rhétorique habitante* and *l'expression habitante*—it seemed to me that, while Heidegger was still a prime reference, Augoyard's urbane language could maneuver through the translation on its own, not entirely beholden to concepts from the Black Forest philosopher. Indeed, as a final translator's note in the present volume points out, the last lines of Augoyard's book pose a clear challenge to a key Heideggerian text—something that may become apparent to the English-speaking reader, however, only

through knowledge of the French translation of the title to Heidegger's first postwar volume, *Holzwege*. (While making no claim to have completely circumnavigated the topic at hand, namely, "everyday walks in an urban setting,"[11] the author states with some conviction that he has blazed his own trails well enough and far enough to establish that "the paths of expression do indeed seem to lead somewhere." The French title of *Holzwege* is *Chemins qui mènent nulle part,* Paths that lead nowhere.) Moreover, *dwelling* evokes a lived state over time (associated by Heidegger with building and thinking), while *inhabiting* can, and does here, connote a mobile, dynamic, and reversible—though not necessarily symmetrical—relationship to home and neighborhood characterized not only by "numerous occasions for pauses and stays" within and beyond one's domicile but also by excursions and explorations, as well as by more or less typified and set patterns of movement in and out of one's dwelling, that relate also to practices offering silent but salient resistance to certain forms of building.[12] Similarly, elsewhere in his tome Augoyard conveys his skepticism about the "static architectural thought" of Le Corbusier, as expressed in the latter's "modulor," which had erected *postures,* not "gaits," into paradigms for an inhabitant's lived experience of "everyday comings and goings."

As it turns out, Augoyard himself has something to say about translation. Near the outset, while reviewing possible leads, subsequently rejected, for ways of investigating how one might account for quotidian strolls through parts of the city, he writes, "A topographical translation, like any interpretation based on continuities and contiguities, . . . seemed to us an improper way of accounting for spatial practices as they are lived day to day." (Topography had at first seemed likely to provide him with the analytic tools for which he was searching: "For a daily stroll, what is more metaphorical than a map?" The related field of *topology,* it should be noted, was then in vogue in Structuralist circles.) This brief statement is in fact expressive of a broader viewpoint, for throughout the book Augoyard is more than suspicious of the one-to-one, univocal, linear correspondences of classical, Saussure-inspired Structuralism. Such an attitude might at first seem surprising, since walking is such

an apparently straightforward activity and a "step by step" approach, taken in a usual sense, would therefore seem particularly well matched here. Nevertheless, we shall subsequently arrive at the place where these steps, full of gaps and in their meandering succession, will be conceived in an entirely other manner.

As he already warned a few pages earlier, "there is always a 'remainder' in analytic operations that involve division." His turning away from "topographical translation" leads him to assert that "daily strolls . . . belong to that class of overlooked practices that apparently cannot be co-opted by the commercial economy and that are, in the view of scientific knowledge, insignificant."[13] Augoyard opts for the less trodden road,[14] for it offers him an alternative to the broad and well-worn path of a traditional scientific-analytic approach designed to discount any "remainder" that cannot precisely be resituated within clear-cut and well-established divisions. Indeed, discussing this nontopographical approach to his chosen topic, he explains that

> the referent for one's walks is not the simultaneity of a planned spatial whole but, rather, at each moment of the stroll, the coexistence of the different instantiated principles involved in everyday life. The explication, the development in movement of this coexistence, resembles a sort of creation, and through this creation the space into which one has gone takes on this or that quality, depending on the occasion, but no longer has any permanency of its own (except in representation and on maps).

Augoyard goes so far as to talk, in chapter 2, about the "creative gait of lived space-time." As will be fathomed later on, the imaginary plays a deeply original role in this creation not only of one's gait but also of the shifting ground upon which that gait is expressed.

How, then, to account for this ambulatory invention of a lived world? Returning to the limits and drawbacks of topography, he asserts that, "better than topographical observation, oral expression has appeared to us to mimic quite closely the act of strolling." Yet here we notice a key, and oft-repeated, gesture in Augoyard's own expository movement, one that I have myself been at pains to re-create in translation. While conceptions of urban planning, the language of linguistics, and

the terminology of rhetoric are integral moments of his overall exposition, his forward motion through and beyond them is quite distinctive and thus worth retracing, for it is the movement itself, not the positions taken up in succession, that, according to my reading via translation, seemed most significant.

Augoyard does state that "the analogy with graphic expression is unendingly striking."

> Just as a book is read in company with a motionless (re)writing and is written at the same time that it is read for oneself and for others, *walking resembles a reading-writing*. Sometimes rather more following an existing path, sometimes rather more hewing a new one, one moves within a space that never tolerates the absolute exclusion of the one or the other.

He follows up this statement, however, with another one: "This analogy is to be pursued so long as it does not betray the lived quality that is of interest to us and so long as it does not reduce the traces of pedestrian activity to a prosaic linguistic system." Mimicry, resemblance, and analogies may indeed serve as temporary guideposts for understanding ambulatory orientation, but the poetic and the creative recover from the descent into the prosaic and the analytic and then overtake them with each new step. One is reminded here of the lyrics to Laurie Anderson's *Big Science* song "Walking and Falling."[15] The tightly constructed format of this book—which, despite an early dismissal of the idea that any "prosaic linguistic system" might account for the creativity of walking practices, could have misled one into thinking of it as straightforwardly "systematic" in conception—eventually comes into focus as a sort of endless rocking motion in a continually off-center forward movement, constantly falling, as if into indefinitely deep holes, and then righting itself in time for the next step.

Step by Step might as a consequence appear to some readers to embody an early example of the "poststructuralist" texts that began to proliferate in the aftermath of Structuralism's wholesale discreditation at the time of May '68. Are we, more than a quarter century later, reading here (in translation) merely one more instance of a rather outdated fashion in Continental thought, now often characterized by undiscerning eclecticism and rampant irresponsibility, that has itself become

increasingly discredited of late—without, however, much of anything substantial filling its shoes? Is this another irrelevant hodgepodge of the "French Ideology," about which University of Minnesota Press author Cornelius Castoriadis wrote so discerningly?[16]

One facet of post-Structuralist thought, Jacques Derrida's, does indeed surface on several occasions in Augoyard's book, with a half-dozen uses of the verb *deconstruct* and its derivatives as well as an enunciation of the concept of "differance" ("this movement, as retention of the other as other in the same").[17] "Inhabitant activity," Augoyard observes, "displays . . . properties [that] cannot be integrated into a systems model that tends toward closure. This is the resolutely disruptive function of everyday events and the fundamental role of spatial deconstruction." "What is heard," for example, ". . . covers over and deconstructs the visual realm, which ordinarily is predominant." He goes on to assert that "the essence of collective life in an urban setting is to be defined not only through the lived experience of oppositions of one social group to another, but also by *a constant tension between constructed spatiality handed over for use and the rhetorical deconstruction of this space, which is done in favor of the expression of styles of inhabiting.*"

These mentions of deconstruction, it may be suggested, can be *taken in stride*. For, one notices that they are but one (though several times repeated) step in a trajectory that includes other steps—as when Augoyard speaks of a "constant tension" of which the moment (or movement) of deconstruction is but one term. With the overturning of the usual terms of analysis employed to describe pedestrian movement, he asks, "If spatial totalities lose all meaning of their own and are but the occasional material and pretext for deconstruction, for derealization, what is the field of reference for everyday action? What is the basic ground brought into play by expression, when laid-out and developed space finds itself relegated to an accidental modality?"[18] It is rather in the elucidation of this "basic ground" and in the scrutiny of "modalities" that we might discover where the author is headed and how far he gets.

Early on, Augoyard hypothesizes that "it would be necessary . . . *to postpone for some time the repetition of our 'why' questions and to give free rein to the 'how'*—that is to say, to substitute a modal type of interpreta-

tion for a causal type of explanation." His "methodological approach" is therefore one "that has chosen the path of *modal analysis* (one oriented by the 'how' rather than by the 'why')."[19] This "modal" emphasis on the "how" over the "why" can be said to be inspired by a phenomenological approach in general—which is characterized by description of experience without reference to causality—and not especially by Derrida's idiosyncratic commentaries thereon in his discussions of Edmund Husserl. Indeed, the only chapter of Augoyard's book with an epigram written by someone other than a poet (René Char and Francis Ponge) or an artist (Wassily Kandinsky) is the fourth one, which cites Merleau-Ponty's early philosophical work *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945). There, the phenomenologists' rallying cry, "*Zu die Sachen selbst*" (To the things themselves), is curiously repeated as a "return to things themselves."[20]

What may be gleaned especially from Augoyard's work is the opportunity, and indeed the necessity, of closely following movement in words as well as in things and people. Merleau-Ponty's odd *return* turns out to be disorienting, but also indicative of larger trends in postwar Continental thought. An existential phenomenologist should have understood that such a "return" is, to say the least, exceedingly unlikely, if not downright impossible, in light of *Repetition,* a key early work by Søren Kierkegaard, the first existentialist to have irrevocably chosen to build his shelter outside the Hegelian system. But it should have already been obvious to any philosopher who has read Heraclitus's twelfth fragment, often loosely translated as "You can never step into the same river twice," let alone his student Cratylus's radicalizing reply that one cannot step into the *same* river even *once*.[21] Indeed, at the other end of his philosophical trajectory, in the "Working Notes" to his posthumously published volume *The Visible and the Invisible,* Merleau-Ponty in effect grants the failure of the entire phenomenological project: "But the thing is not really *observable*—there is always a skipping over in every observation, one is never at the thing itself." This implicit set of admissions—that one never gets "to the things themselves," that one must inevitably "skip over" things in order to observe them, and that observation of things is itself somehow always (already?) deficient[22]—trips up phenomenology at the level of its deepest, most underlying intention (intentionality and its object) while straddling unsuccessfully a key issue in its overall history but also offering itself to further reflection.

One cannot be "at the thing itself" via observation, for observation involves or entails a "skipping over" movement (*enjambement*). Now, in French, *enjambement* has two main senses. *Enjamber* means to stick one's leg up, above, and beyond something, to step over it, to stride forward or stride toward, to span a gap. But *enjambement* also, significantly, has a literary meaning expressed in English by a direct borrowing from the French, spelled "enjambment" or "enjambement." *Wikipedia* (q.v.) defines it as "the breaking of a syntactic unit (a phrase, clause, or sentence) by the end of a line or between two verses. Its opposite is end-stopping, where each linguistic unit corresponds with the line length." Moreover, in enjambment, "meaning flows from line to line, and the reader's eye is pulled forward. Enjambement creates a feeling of acceleration, as the reader is forced to continue reading after the line has ended." Remarkably, we are witnessing here a mutual accompaniment of motion and meaning[23] that might even drive us to think that understanding comes in strides of movement rather than settles into fixed positions.[24] Such a discovery would be as profound as it is moving: the "point," so to speak, is not at point A or point B but in the act of traversing from point A to point B, and beyond.[25]

Of equal significance, and here we ourselves are trying to wend our way back to what might be taken as Augoyard's own winding path through and beyond phenomenological description, Merleau-Ponty's unconscious epitaph to phenomenology was jotted down in the "Working Notes" at precisely the place where he was attempting to come to grips, though not very successfully, with *the imagination*.[26] By way of contrast, after an initial mention of Derridean "differance" the imagination becomes Augoyard's point of departure for the fifth chapter of his book. There, he endeavors to make good on his early promise that walking practices and the act of inhabiting would testify to a creative accomplishment and ongoing force of resistance not wholly reducible to an effect in the preplanned production of space.

In this final chapter, "inhabitant expression" is treated as not only "incorporated," in the Merleau-Pontean sense of embodiment, but also "grounded" in what Augoyard will call "the obscure and overflowing aspect of the imaginary"—therefore, a ground that is as shrouded in darkness as it is slippery, unstable, and not confined to fixed boundaries.

"In anticipating action," inhabitant expression "renders present what 'really' is not yet so." This anticipatory capacity to *bring into being what is not (yet)* introduces the major themes of what have been, in Greco-Western thought, the repeated discovery and covering back over of the imagination since it was first discovered, out of place, in the last book of the treatise *Peri psuchēs*. There, Aristotle says "Never does the soul think without phantasm."[27] Augoyard begins his own exposition with Kant's (re)discovery of it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—there, the latter says, significantly and mysteriously, "This schematism of our understanding applied to phenomena and their mere form is an art hidden in the depth of the human soul, the true secrets of which we shall hardly ever be able to guess and reveal"—and with Kant's subsequent hints at an elaboration in the *Critique of Judgment*. Kantian imagination, he says, connects "understanding and sensibility," gives meaning to "the experience of the world," and allows knowledge to have "concrete application." For Augoyard, "*the imaginable* overflows the limits of . . . spatial 'reality.'" For, "far from being a simple and passive reservoir of images, the imagination possesses an activity and a capacity for synthesis" that "literally outstrips the understanding." Indeed, as Augoyard had himself found earlier and now summarizes here his discoveries, it is by "this same power that the acted and the suffered, sensation and motor function, the present and the absent are tied together in a process of articulation." Instead of *imagination,* he "prefer[s] to designate henceforth such an instantiated principle by the word *imaginary,* which takes on a less restrictive meaning" by comparison.

As antecedents to his own exploration of the imaginary, Augoyard cites in a note the names Sigmund Freud and Gaston Bachelard, who "agree on this industrious circulation of the imaginary that defies the apparent distinctions in whose name mental functions are doggedly separated from one another and our psychosomatic entity is torn asunder."[28] Such a "circulation" takes us back to Augoyard's initial point of departure: the expressive errantry of walking narratives. For him, however, "the power of the imaginary takes on coherency only at the end of our path." And yet his *approach* will be crucial to the outcome: "Instead of a formal definition of the imagination, we have preferred a genetic definition of the imaginary." Closely accompanied along this path by Gilles

Deleuze, Augoyard eschews "theoretical representations" of the role the imaginary plays in human expression, preferring (or enunciating the necessity of) a detour through Renaissance articulations of imagination and expression. He concludes that "the imaginary is a domain, a field of action and of passion that spans the whole of our existence in space and in time. We never leave its soil." Significantly, the word *spans* translates here the French "*traverse*." Augoyard is articulating, in a way, the mobile meaning-creating process of *enjambement* upon an ever-shifting imaginary ground.

Halfway through his Conclusion—in a section titled "An Inhabiting without a 'Why?'"—Augoyard's previously temporary "postpone[ment of] the repetition of our 'why' questions" (in order to pose "how" questions that uncover the expressive creativity of walking practices) is waived in favor of a more long-term suspension, ascribed to the very nature of inhabiting.

> Although the poetic nature of the act of configuring space has become apparent to us, inhabiting has to be understood rather as a movement than as an aesthetic object. Yet, in any case, it is averse to the "why," because the "why" no longer intends anything but representations, whereas the "how" intends things.

It should be noted without delay that, had *habiter* been translated as "dwelling" instead of as "inhabiting," the reader herself would have been stopped in her tracks and unable to proceed, no matter how long and how deeply she might have dwelt upon the possible meaning of the statement that *dwelling* could be encapsulated as *movement*. But *why,* we are tempted to inquire here, is it said that inhabiting resists "why" questions?[29]

Temporary postponement becomes indefinite deferral as phenomenological intentionality metamethodologically remakes an entrance: "the 'why' no longer intends anything but representations, whereas the 'how' intends things." We have trod this ground before and found that we must skip over things in order to observe them:[30] observation goes too far for phenomenological intentionality to live up to its motto, "To the things themselves," and thus the latter ultimately falls short of its own mark. The justification for this backtracking is itself methodologi-

cally inspired by a certain view of phenomenology: the one in which "everyday existence in town" is to be investigated, as Augoyard says, "not as it is represented but as it is lived." Whence this simple binary opposition between lived experience and representation?

The former term comes from the late Husserlian notion of the *Lebenswelt* (life-world) and is expressed in French as *le vécu*—a general term, meaning *real-life* or *personal* experience, given philosophical import primarily by Merleau-Ponty as a way of talking about the subjective side of experience without appearing to indulge in the Cartesian subject–object dualism he had sought to go beyond. The (wholly negative) understanding of "representation" stems here from another of Heidegger's *Holzwege* texts, "The Age of the World Picture."[31] Descartes is considered the culprit by his having brought about this "age" in which "subjects" said to *represent* beings as "objects" triumph as part of an unquestioning technological attitude characterized by wholesale calculation.[32] Curiously, in the penultimate published note to this 1938 talk, when Heidegger envisions a time after this age has expired and the attendant overcoming of Western metaphysics is achieved, man will, he affirms, no longer represent being as an object ("wenn er das Seiende nicht mehr als Objekt vorstellt"). If representation (*Vorstellung*) is, intrinsically and always already, the *placing* of an object *before* a subject and a debased re-presentation in the form of a representational picture (*Bild*), as Heidegger claims, why does he have to add *als Objekt*?

It might seem that we are *going too far afield,* in a translator's Afterword, to concern ourselves with *représentation*'s obvious translation as "representation," let alone with its usage in a third language not mentioned directly in the translated text. Yet it may prove useful to provide the reader with authorial background information—that is, information on the author's background, the steps he has taken previously as well as the voices he has heard along the way, and that continue to speak within him, *even and perhaps especially when he is challenging one of those voices,* as we may hear Augoyard doing vis-à-vis Heidegger at the end of *Step by Step*.[33] Indeed, the ambiguity or reduplication we found in Merleau-Ponty's "return to the things themselves" and in what, for Heidegger's "epochal" reading of Cartesianism, is the pleonasm "represented as an object" is itself repeated by Augoyard himself in his Conclusion—in a passage about repetition:

> If the power of building has been occulted and the term *inhabiting* has become a doublet for *housing,* the play of transformations brought on by economic considerations is not the only thing at issue. The change that has been carried out has taken place through an objectifying representation of housing, one's habitat becoming a housing-object. It has made it possible to think in terms of a standardized product constructed in a repetitive manner.

If, for argument's sake, one accepts Heidegger's conflation of objectification with representation as such,[34] Augoyard's phrase "an objectifying representation" is equally pleonastic. And it is just as necessary, for reasons we shall explore.

For Augoyard, this lived experience certainly includes intention (understood phenomenologically to embrace also protention and retention). He also accepts the vector of affect or feeling ("the present takes on an affective tonality that differs according to whether the eventuality in question is imagined in a harmful or a favorable light"), even if inhabiting, as he said, is not to be envisioned especially as an "aesthetic object."[35] Representation, however, remains for him lived experience's direct opposite: "Inhabitant expression lived in space and in time skips causal or rational sequences and does without streams of representations."[36] But once one has rediscovered *the imaginary,* can one completely "do without" representations (*Vorstellungen*) as well as images or pictures (*Bilder*)?

In *Being and Time,* Heidegger was in a less unilateral and restrictive *mood,* one more inclined to an open-ended *ambulatory* investigation that takes the Peripatetic Philosopher as its point of departure:

> What has escaped notice is that the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life in general has been able to make scarcely *one forward step* worthy of mention since Aristotle. On the contrary, affects and feelings come under the theme of psychical phenomena, functioning as a third class of these, usually along with ideation [*Vorstellungen*] and volition. They sink to the level of accompanying phenomena. It has been one of the merits of phenomenological research that it has again brought these phenomena more unrestrictedly into our sight.[37]

But there, the imperative was to avoid the psychical in order to concentrate on Dasein's basic affective structure—care (*Sorge*)—to the

detriment of considering the world also as will and representation. In inhabitant expression, "what is expressed (for example, avoidance or the seeking out of a qualified site; ease of habitation or inhabitant malaise) refers back to the mode of expression. And in its way of configuring the inhabited space, the mode of expression implies straight off what it endeavors to express." Thus, intention ("avoidance or . . . seeking out") and affect ("ease . . . or . . . malaise") combine without difficulty in imagination. But what of the representation (the "qualified site") itself?

"Let us," Augoyard proposes, "be even more specific":

> Urban atmospheres are born in the crisscrossing of multiple sensations. In this immediate experience of the world, the rain, the wind, and the night hardly have any value of their own. What the inhabitant retains therefrom is the raininess, the windiness, the "fearfulness," that is to say, the affective tonality. Thus, raininess (coldness, dampness, desire for shelter) will qualify the lived world in that very moment. An everyday ambiance takes on a consistency on the basis of a focusing, of a valuing of one element in the environment that will symbolize and reduplicate in an expressive way the atmosphere in which one is bathed.

So, we are to begin with "sensations" (*aisthēseis*). The Merleau-Pontean thesis of the "primacy of perception" is reaffirmed. In lived experience, it is especially an "affective tonality" that is retained, along with and via "focusing" (intention). Curiously, such "focusing" brings about a "symboliz[ation] and reduplicat[ion]" of the basic sensual affects (which supposedly came first, though it is unclear how, before some intentional focusing, there would be any affects in the first place). "There is," says Augoyard citing Pierre Sansot, "a 'reduplication' of urban sites." It is at this point that representation and image make their reappearance: "This color or that coldness will set the tone for all the rest of the sensations and will even enlist, as if by a never extinguished resonance, cultural images, social representations, and ideological reflexes."[38] The primary "sensations" and then a focus-induced "affective tonality" are said to, after the fact, "enlist" such *Vorstellungen*. The origin of representation, its co-originariness, is itself occulted.

"Here," Augoyard, continues, "is one example from the world of sound":

> North African music, which is heard rising up on hot summer nights and wakes up the inhabitants of one "cove" around midnight, often exacerbates feelings of expropriation. . . . But for certain inhabitants, an indulgent sense of satisfaction that "there's a party" is awakened at the same time. And perhaps those people are lulled back to sleep with dreams of an unavowed exoticism.

The world of lived experience, an ever *qualified* world, cannot be construed as a "world of sound" in general. In our everyday social world, "North African music"—a "social representation," surely—is experienced just as directly as chirping crickets, grating elevator noises, or any of the other sonorous examples the author provides. Why this reduplication that is, at the same time, a denial of the equiprimordiality of (social) representation and the latter's inevitable reappearance as merely a secondary quality of lived experience?

In between *Being and Time* and *Holzwege,* Heidegger published another book. Castoriadis, the foremost contemporary philosopher of the imaginary, has commented:

> No doubt it is to Heidegger, with his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), that we owe both the restoration of the question of the imagination as a philosophical question and the possibility of an approach to Kant that breaks with the somnolence and aridity of the neo-Kantians. No doubt, too, that Heidegger reintroduces in his turn and completely on his own—an impressive spectacle—the successive movements of discovery and covering back over that have marked the history of the question of the imagination. . . . Let me simply note here, with respect to the "recoiling" Heidegger imputes to Kant when faced with the "bottomless abyss" opened by the discovery of the transcendental imagination, that it is Heidegger himself who in effect "recoils" after writing his book on Kant. A new forgetting, covering-over, and effacement of the question of the imagination intervenes, for no further traces of the question will be found in any of his subsequent writings; there is a suppression of what this question unsettles for every ontology (and for every "thinking of Being").[39]

No doubt, Kant himself "recoiled" from the principal and preponderant role he himself had attributed to the Transcendental Imagination in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and subsequently decided to suppress by backtracking in the second edition . . . because the "bottomless abyss" would have otherwise eventually upset the ambulatory routine of his daily constitutionals. Heidegger's recoil movement in "The Age of the World Picture" is, by way of contrast, exceedingly reduplica-

tive. The end of his eighth appended note reads: "Man as a representing subject [*vorstellende Subjekt*], however, phantasizes [*phantasiert*], that is to say, he moves [*bewege sich*] within the imagination [*in der imaginatio*], insofar as his representing [*sein Vorstellen*] fancies [*einbildet*] being as the objective [*das Gegenständliche*] in the world as picture [*in die Welt als Bild*]."[40] The "representing subject" is already a redundancy for Heidegger. Its act of representing would be quite literally, with respect to the world, that of a "picturing as picture" (*als Bild einbildet*). The overkill is fatal. For, it is only in a reduplicative language of picturing, imaging, imagining, representing that Heidegger is able to critique the Cartesian dualism of the "representing Subject" and of that subject's particular imaginary view of beings as separate objects. It is also disingenuous, for the "insofar as" (*insofern*) slyly attenuates the otherwise overstated claim that representation is always and everywhere carried out in the form of objectification. Notwithstanding the claim that the Greeks were (or we, once saved by a Heideggerian God, would be)[41] attending to Being when allowing beings to appear as they are in a "clearing" via *phantasia,* we must walk away from this flight from representation once it is recognized that observation never places us at the things themselves, that to go "to" them is also to go over and beyond them, and that the proclaimed "return" thereto has to itself be revisited.[42]

Thus, when Augoyard says, "spanning affectivity, feeling, and motor function, these same symbols [namely, graffiti] produce imaginary resonances that are capable of mobilizing the presently lived act," we find that, *at the very moment he articulates the imaginary in terms of a "spanning,"* he himself has returned in fact to the near side of the *produktive Einbildungskraft* (productive imagination) of Kant's first *Critique,* let alone the idea of a creative imagination at work from the outset. What is imaginary here is *produced* instead of producing, even when it is itself declared to be "capable of mobilizing"; its being is but that of acoustical "resonances" or pale visual copies. That is to say, these attenuated replicas would be of a secondary, merely reproductive, and enfeebled status in comparison with their sensational originals. It was the author himself, however, who had previously complained, near the start of his chapter on imagination, that in the history of thought the imaginary has often wrongly been "confined to the production of images."

It is not surprising, when one is struggling with a rough and formidable predecessor—as the municipally based Augoyard is with the woodsy Heidegger—that one might sometimes stumble or even on occasion be drawn backwards. Our goal is not to *trip up* our author but, rather, to see how he fares in this struggle, perhaps to lend him a hand here and there from the standpoint of elucidating problems of translation. There are indeed many gaps in Heidegger's thinking, and it is understandable that Augoyard might eventually fall into a few of them. As Castoriadis remarks about Heidegger, "Here we have the bizarre spectacle of a philosopher talking interminably about the Greeks, and whose thought draws a blank in the place of *polis, eros,* and *psyche*."[43]

What struck me as I translated this text was instead how well Augoyard negotiates an intellectual terrain he was not, by far, the first to cross. His final chapter offers in fact an exceptional elucidation not only of the unsettled imaginary ground of the inhabitants' expressive lived experience at the Arlequin housing complex but also of that ground's (almost haunted) subterranean underside.[44] There are a specificity and a remarkable quality to these investigations, almost invariably backed up by narrative speech issuing from the residents themselves. As a former community and then labor organizer from the early 1980s, I very much regretted that I had not read *Pas à pas* at the time in order to have benefited from his example as a careful listener of his neighbors' utterances and an attentive companion to them along their peregrinations. And he ends by situating the imaginary as a generative "cosmogenetic point," thus hinting at a genuine ontological basis for this disturbing and disruptive (one is tempted to say *uncanny*) human power within the universe. The "cosmogenesis" of which Augoyard speaks in his Conclusion now inspires the original French editor of the book to talk pertinently in terms of an "anthropogenesis" as well.[45]

The absence, in this book, of an examination of psychical phenomena cannot, I believe, be attributed primarily to Heidegger's Dasein-centered philosophy but, rather, to Augoyard's own stated and quite understandable reluctance to add to or otherwise countenance a literature that attempts to analyze urban residents' experiences in purely psychological terms. Surely he is correct that residential housing and comportment are social phenomena that cannot be reduced to psychical contents. Instead,

Augoyard appeals directly to Freud, among others, when he delineates the "industrious circulation of the imaginary."[46]

Similarly, a certain doubt as to the pertinence and benefits of "scientific" studies is evident in this tome. No doubt, some of this distrustful attitude can be traced back to Heidegger's (and his student Marcuse's) views on technological thinking, as well as to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, with its critique of the abstractness of "every scientific schematization." Indeed, a certain conception of "lived experience," seen as opposed to Cartesian geometrico-scientific thinking, nearly displaces the study of "everydayness" at several points in this work. "Daily strolls," for example, reveal "overlooked practices . . . that are, in the view of scientific knowledge, insignificant."[47] And of "the descriptive study of everyday comings and goings," he says, "we are hardly talking here about a sociological study in the scientific sense of the term." Yet, at the same time, Augoyard's language expresses a certain science-based rhetoric that cannot be overlooked and should not be misrepresented. I have, for example, carefully and closely translated some phrases that in the original French bordered on scientific jargon, yielding "nychthemeral cycle" and "auditory apparatus," whereas "night and day" and "hearing" would have been the more appropriate "everyday" expressions. There are, I believe, professional reasons involved in this complex self-articulation vis-à-vis the sciences. A philosopher by training who became the author of a French state thesis on urbanism that was turned into a volume edited at a prestigious Paris publishing house, Augoyard navigates between a healthy distrust for a purely objective, technical approach to the study of people's everyday activities, on the one hand, and a need to communicate, in a way viewed as legitimate, with an audience still often imbued with such an approach, on the other. We may note that the circumstances surrounding this complex self-articulation continue today, for he was subsequently named a director of research at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and became a founder of its CRESSON (Research Center on Sonorous Spaces and the Urban Environment) unit, whose Architectural and Urban Ambiances group he leads at the Grenoble School of Architecture. Still today, Augoyard directs scientific research and student theses with an eye toward illustrating what traditional scientific approaches leave out and what an

attentive study of people's actual everyday activities and experiences in an urban environment (especially acoustical ones)[48] might reveal. One could recap this admirable endeavor with Aristotle's acute observation that it is not the expert maker of an object, but the *user* thereof, who is the best judge of its utility.[49]

Eros as well as gender considerations do appear largely absent from *Step by Step*. Surely, "the body of inhabitant expression" is a *gendered* one that, in its everyday walking practices, leans on sexed anatomical differences, especially a different configuration of the hips, as well as on socially instituted responses to and expressions of power in relation to erotic life and relations. In a city located in a Western country, especially one situated as Grenoble is in the Alps, this body is a *clothed* one, too. Rereading through the published narrative extracts, one is struck by the consistently expressed concerns of female walkers, from the problem of finding places to rest and sun themselves outside without feeling watched too closely to a sense of imminent danger that is articulated more often (to judge from the available testimony) than is the case with their male counterparts. Augoyard takes passing note of these differences but does not highlight them or provide any specific thematic treatment that would account for such basic and relevant variations.[50]

In this case, however, the void could easily be filled, I believe, by an honest application of what Augoyard himself teaches us about the need to be attentive to everyday walks—and here, especially, in relation to the aforementioned "nychthemeral cycle." By the early 1970s, "Take Back the Night" marches had already been organized by women in several European countries as a response to precisely these sorts of concerns about *freedom of movement*.[51] The first such event on American soil had just taken place in San Francisco in 1978, a year prior to *Pas à pas*. It was not until 2003 that a specifically French version of this trend made its appearance—based, as a matter of fact, to a large extent on the cares of women and girls in outlying housing projects who are faced with (often violent and threatening) traditional and often specifically Muslim male attitudes toward their comings and goings, as well as toward their attire and behavior. This movement took the name "Ni putes, ni soumises" (Neither whores nor submissive) and eventually mobilized a well-attended national demonstration in the wake of grass-

roots organizing and consciousness-raising efforts in largely immigrant and second-generation communities. It would be interesting to apply Augoyard's interview practices and investigative tools to a site-specific sampling of participants in these *marches* in order to see how their everyday walks may or may not have been transformed thereby.

The polis issue is a bit more complicated. On the one hand, for understandable reasons he himself articulates at the start of his book, Augoyard's micromethodology opts for a study of inhabitant narratives in only one strictly delimited part of the city, not the municipality of Grenoble as a whole. On the other hand, it is a municipally instigated housing *policy,* concretely instantiated in actually constructed architectural forms and expressing a certain ideological conception of planning and building with national and global implications, that Augoyard pertinently presents as being challenged by "users'" real walking practices, now rendered explicit and examinable through carefully scrutinized first-person participant narratives.

A bit of extratextual historical background information Augoyard shared with me may be of assistance. Similar to what happened in Burlington, Vermont, where a democratic socialist–led election coalition eliminated an entrenched political machine in 1981 and instituted community-trust housing along with many other innovative reforms, the conservative political forces that had ruled Grenoble in the postwar period were overturned in 1965 by a Socialist-led coalition spearheaded by community associations that sought to reenergize the city via a number of new municipal measures, including the creation of the Arlequin complex. It was a time of policy experimentation; and the Arlequin, combining in one large housing project lodgings adapted to a variety of income levels, was planned as one of the city's showcases. Indeed, Augoyard reports that the Arlequin, begun in the late 1960s and completed in the early 1970s, was viewed as a "utopian" creation designed to manifest and to support a broader effort to change society. From its inception, the author lived there with his wife and child. His knowledgeable, innovative, open-ended method of interviewing fellow residents made him an active participant-observer who was willing to experiment

with the latest theoretical techniques and trends in order to bring out, in great detail, conflicts between users and their built environment as well as to reveal an elemental power to resist and to reshape to which the inhabitant practices thus gathered and discussed bear witness.

Augoyard does address political considerations directly in his Conclusion—in fact, immediately after his declaration that "inhabiting is averse to the 'why,'" as methodologically contrasted there with more fecund "how" questions. "In order to illustrate this radical difference in orientation and to signal at the same time another opening indicated in the modal study of inhabiting, we must mention here the formidable question of *needs*. . . . The problematic of needs includes . . . a logic that is heavy with consequences." To illustrate these consequences, Augoyard quotes an astute comment from former Unified Socialist Party (PSU) presidential candidate and future prime minister Michel Rocard that perfectly illustrates the "being housed" versus "inhabiting" dichotomy so central to the author's argument: "It leads to resolving inequalities, deprivations, and contradictions engendered by capitalism through a vast welfare apparatus. . . . It does not suffice to 'house' people; people must be able to 'inhabit' an individual or collective space."[52] In relation to the logic of needs, Augoyard summarizes the results of his own investigations and explores their broader political implications:

> This logic practically lays down the answer before the question is asked; and under its cloak, the most glaring needs are satisfied along the way. In the process, the power of the giver is reinforced and the necessity of his presence is confirmed. Moreover, how are needs apprehended and interpreted? You look at the "masses," the "users," and, on the basis of social movements and their dynamic, you extract a social content: needs. Social life is abstracted into the notion of need, just as people's practices are reduced to various functions. The abstraction of "functionality" is inserted into a logic that is grounded on the relation of container to contained. Thenceforth, every sort of manipulation is, if not easy, at least possible. The logical presuppositions involved authorize a *logistics,* in the sense of an operational strategy, which includes anticipations of people's use.

It is here that Marcuse's critique of "the new conformism" and, more generally, of the misdeeds of a "technological rationality" gone wild makes its explicit appearance in *Step by Step*.

These critical political considerations are extratextual, however, in the sense that they cannot be gleaned directly from residents' narratives but rather from a certain reading thereof that brings in formulations not expressly articulated by participants themselves in their narratives. As a category for study, "everyday life" allows one, via narratives thereof, to explore inhabitant practices down to the level of "the tiniest gesture made," detecting therein and sketching therefrom a concrete overall form of resistance to a modern objectifying rationality that both upsets one's usual way of conceiving such a rationality and overthrows that rationality's own usual conceptions.[53] Here is how Augoyard expresses this opportunity made possible by his modal methodological study of everyday lived experience:

> The study of everyday walks indicates . . . that there really is much more creative movement, configuration, and dynamic tension going on in the humblest acts of inhabiting than in the very process that produces the contemporary built world. This points to an opening and to an investigative lead in which, on the basis of the lived experience of inhabiting, and not of conceptually designed housing, the imaginary functionally utilized in the production of laid-out and developed space might be confronted with an imaginary the inhabitant actually lives. A certain number of received values would then most likely be overturned, and this expressive power of an irreducible imaginary (one ignored for this reason by discourses on construction and housing) would appear as *a cosmogenetic point*.

And yet narratives of "everydayness"—especially when opposed (perhaps too unreflectively) to reflective thought and, more generally, to "rationality"[54]—do not easily lend themselves to a sustainably articulated political response, and in any case not to one the participants themselves have actually articulated in their narratives.

Augoyard is not the first to have faced this dilemma. The American "Johnson-Forest Tendency"—led by Trinidad-born revolutionary C. L. R. James and Leon Trotsky's former secretary Raya Dunayevskaya, and which became the Detroit-based Correspondence group—published *The American Worker* in 1947. This narrative written by an autoworker pseudonymously designated as "Paul Romano" and accompanied by a political-intellectual analysis from "Ria Stone" (the political activist and trained philosopher Grace Lee Boggs)[55] was later translated

into French and serialized by the Socialisme ou Barbarie group in the first eight issues of its review (March 1949 to January 1951). It was Merleau-Ponty's former high-school philosophy-class student (and later his literary executor) Claude Lefort who proposed, in *Socialisme ou Barbarie*'s eleventh issue (November 1952), a phenomenologically inspired method for analyzing worker narratives. This programmatic text, "L'Expérience prolétarienne" (Proletarian experience), is quite instructive. As the historian of the group Stephen Hastings-King reports,

> Lefort, in keeping with the group's anti-Leninism, argued that only workers could know, and write about, their experience. Lefort's essay posed the theoretical questions to be addressed by Socialisme ou Barbarie's projected collection, publication and analysis of autobiographical worker narratives. He situated these questions relative to two exemplary texts: Paul Romano's "The American Worker" and Eric Albert's "Témoinage: La vie en usine." Lefort used these narratives of worker shop-floor experience . . . as primary data in a phenomenological investigation of "the proletarian standpoint." The goal of this investigation was the isolation and description of the "significations" or games that structured proletarian comportment. The full project would have relied upon phenomenological procedures (reductions) that were never carried out because, despite the solicitation for writings which frequently appeared in *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (as well as in related projects like *Tribune Ouvrière*), workers simply did not write.[56]

In relation to this precursor effort, Augoyard can be said to have made two positive advances. First, in the related field of working-class habitation and habitat, he discovered and developed a way of soliciting significant numbers of first-person participant narratives of everyday struggle.[57] Second, his application of literary techniques of analysis fostered a critical and reflexive approach to these narratives while he himself remained an engaged participant-observer. Noting the rhetorical basis for any recounting of even the "tiniest gestures," the author of *Pas à pas* highlighted a feature that had remained obscure or underthematized in Socialisme ou Barbarie's uncritical take on workers' narratives as straightforward and transparent accounts unencumbered by the mediated labor of writing or recounting.[58] And finally, Augoyard's movement-centered elucidation of narratives of everyday walking practices brought out homologies between words and actions without ever reducing one to the other or prioritizing one over the other.

A few words should also be written about Augoyard's theme of *everydayness* in relation to its theoretical precursors as well as to its political implications. In a French postwar context, the obvious initial reference is to Lefebvre's three-volume *Critique of Everyday Life,* the first volume of which appeared in 1947. This effort started out, in part, as a critique of *Being and Time*'s conception of the "everydayness" (*Alltäglichkeit*) of the "they"'s ontologically unaware fallenness. Lefebvre, a Marxist philosophical-sociological critic of both rural and urban life, sought to unmask the everyday alienation inherent in a cityscape inundated with rural outcasts and transformed by urban capitalism. Owing in part to this critique, Lefebvre exercised an influence on Situationist International members from 1958 until 1962, "when there was," as *Not Bored!* editor Bill Brown explains, "a nasty falling-out."[59] Raoul Vaneigem's 1967 text *The Revolution of Everyday Life* nevertheless testifies to an ongoing Situationist interest in this theme, linked, as in Lefebvre's work, to the category of *lived experience*—but with a connotation to "everydayness" that seems more positive and actively involved in political and social struggle:[60] "Revolution is made everyday despite, and in opposition to, the specialists of revolution. This revolution is nameless, like everything springing from lived experience. Its explosive coherence is being forged constantly in the everyday clandestinity of acts and dreams."[61] Nonetheless, it would be exceedingly difficult to trace a direct line between Situationist *dérive* and what we have called the "expressive errantry of walking narratives" studied and revealed in Augoyard's work. And both of the operative terms in Situationist "psycho-geography" seem alien to Augoyard's anti-psychological and anti-topological methodological practice. Nor do either a philosophy of desire or any grand pronouncements figure in *Pas à pas,* whereas Vaneigem took the time to declare: "The complete unchaining of pleasure is the surest way to the revolution of everyday life, to the construction of the whole man."[62] What Augoyard contributes is a positive and precise understanding of the role of everyday struggle, as exemplified in people's actual walking practices within a preplanned built environment. And this is precisely what Michel de Certeau picked up and borrowed in his book *The Practice of Everyday Life*. The already established author de Certeau nevertheless turned down a request to preface Augoyard's

maiden volume before publishing, one year later, his own tome, which was indebted to Augoyard's groundbreaking thesis and which received greater attention.[63]

A final contextual note. When I visited the Arlequin with Augoyard in September 2004, it was a quite different place from the way it was twenty-five years earlier. With the intervening installation of a right-wing municipal government, the extensive set of social programs, services, and amenities that were conceived as an integral and ongoing part of this showcase housing project had been cut drastically in the interim, just as residents had feared. The "power of the giver" has withdrawn along with the welfare-state giver. Vandalism was on the rise, Augoyard reported, and had become more invasive and irrational—door locks, for example, filled with glue, necessitating purchase of new locks—to the point where the Augoyard family, who had been contemplating this move for nearly a decade, finally decided to move out. (My tour began at their new home in a low-rise apartment building at the edges of the Arlequin's grounds. What is notable is in fact how long they lived at this housing project that was the inspiration for Augoyard's first book, before moving out when their child became an adult.) Always a significant presence, the North African and Muslim communities had grown, and there were signs of fundamentalism—though, Augoyard observed, such signs are fleeting and ambiguous: the head of household who might one day be wearing a long beard could and sometimes did cut it off and switch allegiances the next. The general municipal neglect of such outlying housing projects, the widespread discrimination suffered by immigrant and second-generation communities in France, and the poor overall economic situation of left-out segments of the population in a deindustrializing Western country had been evident and were taking their toll for many years. Finally, the situation exploded into violence across France in the fall of 2005, with mass car burnings, confrontations with police and other authorities, and extensive vandalism often aimed at symbols and buildings of the state.

What are the methodological tools that might be employed today for someone who wishes to address the situation at Arlequin or in other poor and working-class communities in France and elsewhere while still giving direct voice to participants and offering pertinent analysis of their

experiences and ongoing self-activity? In what ways might the methodological contributions and, more important, investigational leads offered by *Step by Step* help to advance such an endeavor? It goes beyond the confines of a translator's afterword to prescribe for the reader what she should make of what has been read in the present volume. For my part, I have confined myself to offering what might be pertinent background information while conveying the problems a translator faces and the reflections he has had in the actual practice of making a text available to persons who will now themselves attempt to inhabit this text critically in another language within the International Republic of Letters.

My thanks to Catherine Porter, for recommending me for another collaboration with the University of Minnesota Press; to my editors there, first Carrie Mullen and then Jason Weidemann, for their support and their patience; to Beau David Case, for his exemplary librarian research skills; to the Augoyard family, for their hospitality and helpful suggestions; to Françoise Choay, for her continued participation in a book project she first made possible more than a quarter-century ago; and to Alex Gezerlis, whose kindness and generosity are matched by his keen and critical eye for my literary weaknesses.

This translation is dedicated to Clara Gibson Maxwell, my companion on the road of life, whose dancing and choreography continually teach me the meaning of an existence in movement.

4. See our analysis of the process of conception-production of a high-density housing complex: "Des opérationnels autour de l'Arlequin."

5. Rocard, "La France en quête d'un avenir."

6. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man,* 84.

7. See chapter 1 of Medam's *La Ville-Censure*.

8. Durand, *Science de l'homme et tradition: Le Nouvel Esprit anthropologique,* 143.

9. In the sense in which the one-dimensional false consciousness denounced by Herbert Marcuse as representation of a destiny of productivity did not yet carry weight.

10. Cf. the bitterness and regrets of a frustrated creativity, quite well analyzed in Lugassy's work *Le Discours idéologique des architectes et urbanistes*.

11. See Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style,* originally published in German in 1908.

12. For this passage, we have borrowed the French translation given by Henri Maldiney at the University of Lyon in 1969 [and then retranslated it into English; for the available English translation, which differs somewhat, see *The Thinking Eye: The Notebooks of Paul Klee,* 169.—*Trans*].

13. Ibid. [English translation again somewhat altered to reflect the French translation from the German.—*Trans*.]

14. [It should be noted, for the reader of the present French-to-English translation, that the 1962 French translation of Martin Heidegger's 1950 volume, *Holzwege* (literally: wood trails; a recent English-language translation has *Off the Beaten Track*), was titled *Chemins qui mènent nulle part* (paths that lead nowhere), and thus is the opposite of what Augoyard affirms concerning the paths of expression at the close of his book.—*Trans*.]

Appendix B

1. *Zone d'urbanisation en priorité (ZUP)*.

Afterword

The ambulatory dialogue between author and translator, broached on that crisp fall day in Grenoble and continued in the present text (placed most appropriately as an Afterword), has been pursued in an exchange available on the author's professional Web site, www.cresson.archi.fr/sbs.html.

1. I make explicit here my American prejudice against the International

Style, which was reinforced by my 2000–2001 residency at Taliesin West at the invitation of the Frank Lloyd Wright School of Architecture.

2. This experience was the reverse of the one Laurie Anderson drolly described in her eponymous song from *Big Science* (1982) depicting disorientation in a future-dominated builtscape: "Hey Pal! How do I get to town from here? And he said: Well, just take a right where they're going to build that new shopping mall, go straight past where they're going to put in the freeway, take a left at what's going to be the new sports center, and keep going until you hit the place where they're thinking of building that drive-in bank. You can't miss it. And I said: This must be the place." This song includes a sly comment on fictionalized landscaping reminiscent of the Arlequin's mounds: "You know. I think we should put some mountains here. Otherwise, what are all the characters going to fall off of?" I know not whether Anderson ever read Jean Baudrillard on simulacra, but it is known that she studied Merleau-Ponty at Columbia with Arthur C. Danto.

3. Like Proust (translator of John Ruskin) or Paul Auster (translator of Pierre Clastres).

4. But not even a hint of influence, so far as I can tell, from the existentialist philosopher of an absolute freedom Jean-Paul Sartre, who also wrote on the imagination.

5. The University of Minnesota Press originally took an interest in translating *Pas à pas* as an outgrowth from its publication of Lefebvre's *The Urban Experience*.

6. There is in *Step by Step* one late, and quite intriguing, reference to the death of modernity: "Building is missing-in-action, not dead. And its potentialities are still exercised in a virtual way in the obscure confrontations between *inhabitant* expression and constructed space. We would say, rather, that the 'modern' is what has just died; it is already conceptuality, already fixed in place. It is dead absolutely, that is, as soon as one lays down the first stone, as soon as its first object is sketched out, for it has rid itself of lived time. And rather than calling for a return to the past, we would prefer to grant, as a plausible outcome, self-construction." Postmodernism, however, seems absent from the present volume. Jean-François Lyotard's volume on the postmodern condition, *La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir* had only come out the same year *Pas à pas* was published; nonetheless, the term had already existed for decades and was popularized two years earlier in Charles Jencks's *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture*. And the "plausible outcome" of "self-construction" seems rather alien to postmodern concerns, being reminiscent, rather, of Cornelius Castoriadis's 1975 major work *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (trans. Kathleen Blamey [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998]), even though Augoyard, himself work-

ing on the imagination at the time, had not read this volume. Because of similarities of concerns and an overlap of themes between Augoyard and Castoriadis, I have often referred to the latter's work while translating and reflecting upon the former's. It is indeed fascinating to witness these two intellectual trajectories developing at the same time within the context of postwar French thought. I have been helped in my examination of Augoyard's work by Castoriadis's own reading of Yves Barel, another author whose work developed in parallel with his during the 1970s: see Castoriadis's "Complexity, Magmas, History: The Example of the Medieval Town" (1993), in *The Rising Tide of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep),* available online starting at: http://notbored.org/RTI.html.

Neither does Michel Foucault's name make an appearance. Augoyard's microscopic study of appropriations and counterappropriations—themselves couched in Saussurean terms of mutually generated difference based on the arbitrariness of the sign but being, most proximately, of Lefebvrean provenance—might nevertheless make one think of that theorist of micropowers. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine Foucault, champion of powerlessness, speaking affirmatively, as Augoyard does, about "the power of the imaginary."

7. Not to forget a wealth of premodern and early modern influences: as Augoyard notes, his master's thesis was written on the topic "Imagination and Nature in Giordano Bruno." Those who would take *Step by Step* to be merely a clever text in urban studies or a microanalysis of a particular housing complex would miss a great deal of the philosophical intent and import of this quite remarkable volume.

8. A nearly impossible, not to say infinite, task, given the complexity and overlap of the multitude of referrals involved.

9. In French, *interprète* can mean both "performer" (like Ion) and "interpreter-translator." Nevertheless, to the extent that one can say that a translation is an artistic *re-creation* of voices and significations in another tongue, the term *interpretation,* with its merely *hermeneutic* overtones, seems quite inadequate and inappropriate.

10. In a "Tribune libre" for the December 28, 2005, issue of the Communist newspaper *L'Humanité* ("Bâtir la ville: le désir de civilisation"), Jean-Paul Dollé proposes an amalgam of Heidegger (Dollé cites "Bâtir, habiter, penser") and Lefebvre (he also mentions "the production of space") as a frame for discussing the fall 2005 riots in France. Yet, in contrast to Augoyard, he fails to take as his point of departure the self-articulating position of the inhabitant-user of this space.

11. Augoyard explains in chapter 2: "In any case, one never makes a complete tour around the everyday as it is lived." This apposite claim to, or admission of, nonexhaustiveness is made on several occasions. It is to be noted that "An

Essay on Everyday Walks in an Urban Setting" is the proper English translation of the book's subtitle. A compromise subtitle, "Everyday Walks in a French Urban Housing Project," was settled on for the present translation.

12. "To dwell" has been reserved, instead, to translate *demeurer* and its derivatives, as in "the possibility of dwelling, of coming to a stop" plus "city dweller" for *citadin,* and for Choay's use of the term *habiter* when discussing it in relation to Heidegger. Also, "dwelling" connotes *meditation* on allegedly profound matters, while "inhabiting" indicates a mobile bodily practice.

13. The author wisely added "apparently" with regard to walking practices' assumed resistance to co-optation. For, along with malls (*centres commerciaux*), a major urban planning and design contrivance popularized in France, as elsewhere, since this book was originally published, has been the deployment and proliferation of *voies piétonnes,* "pedestrian ways" (generally designated in the States as "walking streets") devoid of cars that funnel pedestrians and foster shopping in an environmentally more friendly setting, thereby "democratizing" (to use an abusive, journalistic term) and further commercializing the experiences of the Baudelairean dandy and Walter Benjamin's flâneur. (See, on an early-twentieth-century artistic transfiguration of these two nineteenth-century pedestrian figures, Giovanna Zapperi's "Marcel Duchamp's Dandyism: The Dandy, the Flâneur, and the Beginnings of Mass Culture in New York during the 1910s," translated by me and available at http://www.artsetsocietes.org/a/a-zaperri.html.)

14. "Two roads diverged in a wood, and I, / I took the one less traveled by, / And that has made all the difference" (Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken"). As we shall soon see, however, even this mutual exclusion is, according to Augoyard, to be avoided: "Sometimes rather more following an existing path, sometimes rather more hewing a new one, one moves within a space that never tolerates the absolute exclusion of the one or the other."

15. Augoyard immediately and enthusiastically recognized the Anderson lyric reference when I mentioned it to him; he was familiar with the song on account of his son Erwan, now a filmmaker.

16. See mentions of the "French Ideology" in "Social Transformation and Cultural Creation" (1979), from Castoriadis's *Political and Social Writings,* vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 304, as well as in "The Movements of the Sixties" (1986), from his collection *World in Fragments* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 51. The obvious reference here is to Marx and Engels's attack on the irrelevancies of their contemporaries in *The German Ideology*.

17. An early indication of the limits of a deconstructive approach to walking practices is perhaps contained in the very citation of Derrida's concept of "differance" (note 16 to chapter 3): "It is not the question of a constituted differ-

ence here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the *pure* movement which produces difference. *The (pure) trace is differance.*" It is unclear how such a hypostatized notion of "purity" can account for the messy *everydayness* of such movement practices.

18. There are two further mentions of deconstruction.

19. This modal methodological approach, he acknowledges, "comes up right away against a major difficulty": people's tendency to forget. The investigator addresses this problem by asking a "how" question—"How do you walk through your neighborhood; what trips do you take?"—in a protentional rather than retentional mode (the interviewees are to provide their answers only after a suitable lapse of time and after having had the actual experience with this question in mind). Of note, the protentional/retentional terminology stems originally from Edmund Husserl's 1928 work *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (based on his 1905–10 lectures) and is an extension of his method of intentional analysis, derived from the "intentionality" thesis developed by his teacher Franz Brentano.

20. In fact, in Husserl himself, this call was already articulated as a "going back" ("wir wollen auf die 'Sachen Selbst' züruckgehen").

21. Plato *Cratylus* 401d (on Heraclitus) and Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1010a 13–15 (on Cratylus). Perhaps Heraclitus's most famous fragment begins "All things flow" (*panta rhei*).

22. A questionable, but key, thesis in Merleau-Ponty concerns "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences." This 1946 talk, first published in French in 1947, forms the eponymous text for *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays,* ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

23. In French, *sens* means both "meaning" and "direction," an overlap of significations exploited in particular by Merleau-Ponty, as Stephen Hastings-King points out in his 1999 Cornell University history PhD dissertation, "Fordism and the Marxist Revolutionary Project: A History of Socialisme ou Barbarie, Part I," 192.

24. Of course, *movement* here is to be taken in its Aristotelian sense of *change* or *alteration,* of which there are four species, and not limited to its Galilean sense alone of *local movement*. Lest it be thought that I am making a fetish of movement, allow me to recommend, by way of contrast, the work of the late post-Surrealist artist, sculptor, and writer Pol Bury, including his book *Les Horribles mouvements de l'immobilité* (Paris: C. Martinez, 1977); see also my translation of André Balthazar's text for one of Bury's catalogs: "Pol Bury or Murmured Slowness," in *Pol Bury. La lenteur murmurée* (Paris: Galerie Louis Carré, 2004), 9–11.

25. One wonders why Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy was not an appropriate reference for Augoyard.

26. Merleau-Ponty's May 1959 Working Note, titled "Transcendence of the thing and transcendence of the phantasm," begins as follows: "The transcendence of the thing compels us to say that it is plenitude only by being inexhaustible, that is, by not being all actual under the look——but it promises this total actuality, since it *is there*. . . .

"When we say that—on the contrary—the phantasm is not observable, that it is empty, non-being, the contrast with the sensible is therefore not absolute. The senses are apparatus to form concretions of the inexhaustible, to form existent significations——" And here, still couched in the language of Husserlian phenomenology, is what follows the statement just quoted, about things not really being observable: "What we call the *sensible* is only the fact that the indefinite [succession] of *Abschattungen precipitates*——But, conversely, there is a precipitation or crystallization of the imaginary, of the existentials, of the symbolic matrices" (*The Visible and the Invisible* followed by *Working Notes* [1964], ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968], 191–92). What Merleau-Ponty describes in static or fixed terms as "concretions" and "precipitation or crystallization" could have been rearticulated in mobile terms by extending his metaphor of "enjambment," meaning-creation through ongoing strides. I believe that Augoyard's book points in this direction.

27. Aristotle *Peri psuchēs* 431a17. See Castoriadis's "The Discovery of the Imagination," in *World in Fragments*. Although he does not present this history as thoroughly and profoundly as Castoriadis does, Augoyard is quite aware of these multiple rediscoveries and successive cover-ups: "Several times in the history of thought, the imaginary has been considered neither as one of the lower faculties, archaic in origin and confined to the production of images, nor as too confused a faculty to be able to attain the empire of reason, too uncultivated and too uncontrolled in its sudden appearances to be a bearer of truth. Each time our 'imaginary' capacity has been taken into account as a whole, it was in order to point to its operative function: *imagining is the power to connect*. The imagination is the *medium* par excellence.

"Thus, Kantianism—which, two centuries ago, did not immediately preoccupy itself with the instantiated principle of the imaginary—nevertheless conferred upon it the threefold role of reproducing, synthesizing, and creating." And Augoyard, author of that Giordano Bruno thesis, offers precious indications as to the historical role of the imagination in Renaissance thought, about which Castoriadis has not written (at least in the extant and posthumous work published so far). On the other hand, with the introduction of *anticipation* as origin of the realization of the real via the imaginary ("render[ing] present

what 'really' is not yet so"), the entire basis (ground) for Augoyard's aforementioned "protentional" method of interviewing inhabitants is itself tossed up into the air.

28. He also footnotes the work of the philosopher and social theorist Gilbert Durand, founder, in 1966, of the University of Grenoble II's Center for Research on the Imaginary. Augoyard explained to me that the mention of Durand in his thesis (and subsequently in his book) was a late addition made after he had learned that Durand would be on the thesis committee.

29. This consistent denigration of the "why" is particularly perplexing in light of Augoyard's insistence that, "however unremarkable our ways of inhabiting might be, they would never depart from a climatic pregnancy that never leaves them totally 'unmotivated.'" It is perhaps understandable that the author wishes to view inhabiting not only as "movement" but also as *motivated*. (The "power of the imaginary," however, would more plausibly opt, rather, for a present participle with future implications—*motivating*—although the imaginary's interpenetration of action and passion would militate instead for past and present participles combining in an ongoing *Stiftung*, Husserl's German word for "institution.") And he wishes to challenge Saussurean linguistics, which is based, by way of contrast, on linearity and the arbitrariness of the sign: "expression is never carried out according to an arbitrary relation and does not unfold in a single dimension." But what, we may ask, is the sense in saying that inhabiting is *motivated* (taken here by Augoyard to mean the opposite of "arbitrary") and yet eschews the "why"? Augoyard is battling against Saussurean-based Structuralism, and he thereby becomes a champion of expressive creativity. But he has yet to reach the vista where the risky possibility of positing the "why" and the metanecessary arbitrariness of creation themselves combine in, as well as flow from, an unmotivated, self-positing (indeed, self-instituting) imaginary that alters itself not just in time but as time. And yet this is precisely what his "cosmogenetic point," in his Conclusion, could itself eventually generate.

30. The ambulatory act of "skipping over" is not to be confused, of course, with the high-flying bird's-eye or God's-eye view (*pensée de survol*) Merleau-Ponty rightly criticized.

31. One finds the lived experience/representation opposition often in Merleau-Ponty's work, too. The denigration of representation, in this case tied even more directly to causality, also may be found in a passage from Deleuze that Augoyard quotes: "What is expressed is sense: deeper than the relation of causality, deeper than the relation of representation" (Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* [1968], trans. Martin Joughin [New York: Zone Books, 1990], 335).

32. In the sixth part of his 1637 *Discourse on Method,* Descartes does indeed talk about "represent[ing] my life as in a picture," and the terms *représen-*

tation and *tableau* (but also *imagination*) do appear a number of times in this and other Cartesian works. For his part, Heidegger provides no textual evidence of his own here.

33. See also the May 1960 Working Note "'Visual Picture' → 'representation of the world' *Todo y Nada,*" where, in a line of descent from Heidegger's "The Age of the World Picture," Merleau-Ponty seeks to "generalize the critique of the visual picture into a critique of '*Vorstellung*'" (*The Visible and the Invisible* followed by *Working Notes,* 252). This he does even after his admission that "one is never at the thing itself"!

34. Heidegger could just as easily have understood *Vor-stellung* to mean a "putting forth" of images, their "placing in advance," instead of a static and objective "setting before" (a subject). Many German *vor-* words have the former two senses. See "Merleau-Ponty and the Weight of the Ontological Tradition," in *World in Fragments,* 282, where Castoriadis speaks of "a representation in the 'active' sense . . . that is not placing-something-in-front-of-someone but rather is that by which and in which every placing and every place exist, originary positing starting from which every position—as 'act' of a subject or 'determination' of an object—has being and meaning." Such an understanding and acceptance of imaginary representation could rejoin the meanings of *enjambement* explored earlier and inspired by Augoyard's movement-oriented method.

35. When this phrase was first cited, it seemed that the operative word was "aesthetic," but now it appears that what is being contested especially is "objecthood"—which would be condemned for *representationalism*. That is to say, Augoyard has no objection in principle to *aisthēsis,* so long as the feeling of inhabiting is understood as movement.

36. Here, "skips" and "does without" are translations for the French phrase *faire l'économie de*. Augoyard goes on to state the important points that, in the imaginary realm establishing the ground for real life, neither set theory nor identitary logic operates and that the individual can be opposed to or considered separate from the social sphere only via abstraction: "there is nothing about [inhabitant expression] of a 'relation' of part to whole or of a 'relation' of the individual to the 'socius.'" Despite the dubious Heideggerian pronouncement that "representation" would somehow be absent from "lived experience" (instead of their being, thanks to the imaginary, mutually interpenetrative), we can see that, as with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, what is truly being contested is subject–object dualism and a *specific* representational reduction of things, people, and processes to inert and manipulable objects: "the same goes for rationalizing explanations that would yield on the one hand the subject, on the other hand the object, on the one hand knowing, on the other hand the world in itself." The

genuine topic at hand for Augoyard is an elucidation of the imaginary via inhabitant expression: "To the extent that everyday life can find meaning qua expression, the imaginary proposes itself as the essential referent to which the moments of inhabiting, and all the spaces inhabited, relate. The imaginary weaves beneath each present lived experience a ground the imaginary immediately gives to it as world."

37. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1928), trans. John Marcquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston, Ill.: Harper & Row, 1962), 140 (emphasis added). If we take Heidegger's early talk of *Vorstellung* and add thereto his mentions of "affective life" and "volition" (the latter in its most general sense as the distinctly human form of intention and desire), we have, in Castoriadis's terminology, "the three characteristics of the *for-itself,* which were first sifted out as distinct elements during the fifth century B.C.E. in ancient Greece. Everywhere there is the for-itself there will be representation and image, there will be affect, there will be intention; in ancient terminology: the logico-noetic, the thymic, and the orectic. This goes for a bacterium as well as for an individual or for a society" ("The State of the Subject Today," in *World in Fragments,* 146).

38. This "never extinguished resonance" also seems to be of Merleau-Pontean provenance.

39. Castoriadis, "The Discovery of the Imagination," 215–16.

40. Heidegger, "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" (1938), in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1977), 106.

41. "Only a God Can Save Us" is the 1976 title of the posthumously published interview *Der Spiegel* conducted with Heidegger a decade earlier.

42. In fact, Augoyard's characterization of the imaginary's "industrious *circulation*" provides us with the key dynamic phrase for following these otherwise paradoxical movements of redundancy and repetition. The best work on this question is that of the Italian philosopher Fabio Ciaramelli; see my translation: "The Self-Presupposition of the Origin: Homage to Cornelius Castoriadis," in *Thesis Eleven* 49 (May 1997): 45–67. I thank Ciaramelli for pointing me to Heidegger's "The Age of the World Picture" and helping me to orient myself in relation to that text.

43. Cornelius Castoriadis, "The 'End of Philosophy'?" in *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy,* ed. David Ames Curtis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 15.

44. Let it be noted that *Arlequin,* the name of this housing project, is French for "Harlequin": the traditional comic character of pantomime theater. Augoyard's book is not without its own humor. And the hexagon form of the Arlequin's basic architectural design recalls France's general hexagonal shape.

(France is often referred to as "the Hexagon.") In many ways, *Step by Step* is a lively and witty critique of an entire French way of thinking about building, housing, and residing.

45. In the time of the polis, political terms and cosmological terms creatively intertwined and interpenetrated within ancient Greek philosophy. See Jean-Pierre Vernant's 1962 book *The Origins of Greek Thought* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982). To account for cosmogenesis as well as anthropogenesis, philosophers, historians, and poets created cosmogonies and anthropogonies. On the latter, see Castoriadis's "Aeschylean Anthropogony and Sophoclean Self-Creation of Man" (1991), in *Figures of the Thinkable (Including Passion and Knowledge),* available online starting at: http://notbored.org/FTPK.html.

46. In light of the originary redundancy of representation, it might be worthwhile to examine more closely a phrase from Freud. Despite his scientistic leanings as a medical man and a nineteenth-century offspring of the Enlightenment, Dr. Freud managed not only to integrate the imagination (via phantasy) into his psychoanalysis but also to place it, at least implicitly, at the center of his concerns. When he writes of the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz des Triebes*—representation's representative of the drive—he is providing a useful justification, in metapsychological terms, not only for representations and for representing as *Vorstellungen* and *Vorstellen* but also for representation as re-presentation in representation of an a-representational drive. (In "Logic, Imagination, Reflection" [1991], now in *World in Fragments,* Castoriadis provides the references in Freud as follows: *Gesammelte Werke,* 10:285 = *Standard Edition,* 14:186. Although Castoriadis knowingly described this phrase as "limpid," I do not believe that he ever explicitly explored the significance of its startling redundancy.)

47. Here and elsewhere I have heightened the point by translating *savoir* as "scientific knowledge" in order to contrast it with familiar knowledge (*connaissance*). In French, after all, a *savant* is a "scientist."

48. Augoyard is himself an accomplished musician, his wife a former dancer. He is the editor of *La qualité sonore des espaces habités/Sound Quality in the Living Environment* (bilingual acts of a March 1991 colloquium; Grenoble: CRESSON, 1992), and the coauthor, with Henry Torgue, of *À l'Écoute de l'environnement. Répertoire des effets sonores* (Marseille: Éditions Parenthèses, 1995). Today, he directs the "Ambiances, ambiance" series at Éditions à la croisée. His volume *Sonic Experience: A Guide to Everyday Sounds,* also edited along with Henry Torgue, with a Preface by R. Murray Schafer and translated by Andra McCartney and David Paquette, was just published by McGill-Queen's University Press in 2006.

49. Augoyard offered the example of a student of his who spent months studying how people actually go into and out of a commercial center's revolving

and fixed doors, noting how such practices differ from the designer's theoretical anticipations thereof.

50. When I raised this issue with Augoyard near the end of my tour of the Arlequin complex, he readily admitted that there was a point to what I was saying but it was not possible to analyze these narratives from all perspectives—a point he had already rightly made in general in his book, and that is in fact a basic principle of his "step-by-step" approach that makes no pretense to offering a general overview.

51. We find at http://crisis.vianet.on.ca/march.htm the following excerpt from a "Take Back the Night" statement: "Women are often told to be extra careful and take precautions when going out at night. In some parts of the world, even today, women are not allowed out at night. So when women struggle for freedom, we must start at the beginning by fighting for freedom of movement, which we have not had and do not now have. We must recognize that freedom of movement is a precondition for anything else. It comes before freedom of speech in importance because without it freedom of speech cannot in fact exist." Given that this *statement* is itself an instance of speech, the hierarchization between freedom in movement and freedom in speech seems implausible. Yet we should remain attentive to the salutary emphasis on the importance of unencumbered and unthreatened pedestrian *movement* that this statement articulates.

52. Rocard, it may nevertheless be noted, made this astute comment in April 1974, just as he was preparing to leave the *autogestion* (self-management)-inspired PSU, with its legacy of post–May '68 politics, so as to lead a minority of its members to join the regrouped French Socialist Party.

53. Similarly, in a 1974 interview summarizing the work of the postwar French revolutionary group Socialisme ou Barbarie (1948–67), Castoriadis declares apropos of workers' gestures: "The history of modern industry, however, is not only the history of great pitched union battles; it is also and especially the history that unfolds eight hours a day, sixty minutes per hour, sixty seconds per minute in production and apropos of production; during each of these seconds, each gesture of the worker has two sides to it, one that conforms to the imposed production norms, the other combating those norms. Effective output is the result of the struggle that unfolds upon this terrain. Labor power, therefore, has no definite use value that one might grasp independent of this struggle and its effects" ("'The Only Way to Find Out if You Can Swim Is to Get into the Water': An Introductory Interview," in *The Castoriadis Reader,* ed. David Ames Curtis [Malden, Mass., and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997], 18). A decade earlier, in the third point of his programmatic text "Recommencing the Revolution," Castoriadis had already articulated such gesture analysis in terms of everydayness: "Certainly, society today still remains profoundly divided. It

functions against the immense majority of working people. In their everyday lives, these people express their opposition to this society with half of each one of their gestures. The present crisis of humanity will be able to be resolved only through a socialist revolution. But these ideas run the risk of remaining empty abstractions, pretexts for sermons or for a blind and spasmodic activism, if we do not strive to understand how society's divisions are concretely being realized at the present hour, how this society functions, what forms of reaction and struggle laboring people adopt against the ruling strata and their system, what new kinds of revolutionary activity related to people's concrete existence and struggle in society and to a coherent and lucid view of the world are possible under these conditions" (ibid., 107).

54. In *Step by Step*'s quotation from *One-Dimensional Man,* Marcuse explains that this "new conformism" is "new because it is rational to an unprecedented degree," instead of examining (through people's involved everyday struggles against it) the *irrationality* inherent in modern bureaucratic-capitalist *rationalization* processes.

55. See Grace Lee Boggs, *Living for Change: An Autobiography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

56. Hastings-King, "Fordism and the Marxist Revolutionary Project," 176.

57. These oral and written narratives that Augoyard obtained are not at all to be confused with detached and isolated individual responses to the usual "scientific survey" questions.

58. This is one of Hastings-King's critical conclusions about the limitations on Socialisme ou Barbarie's use of workers' narratives: in neither Lefort's 1952 programmatic text advocating phenomenological analysis of such narratives (via eidetic variation) nor in subsequent efforts by the group to solicit, publish, and employ such texts did it succeed in controlling for these texts' rhetorical origins. In later life, Lefort published a collection of essays whose aim was to come to terms with the political aspects of literary texts and the literary aspects of political texts; translated into English by me as *Writing: The Political Test* (Durham, N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 2000), this book strangely makes no explicit reference to his earlier efforts in "L'Expérience prolétarienne."

59. See Brown's insightful review, "Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space,*" *Not Bored!* 30 (February 1999): 65–76, also available at http://www.notbored.org/space.html.

60. In a 1957 Socialisme ou Barbarie text that forms the second part of a three-part series "On the Content of Socialism," Castoriadis had already articulated this more positive understanding of the everyday: "Socialism aims at giving a meaning to people's life and work; at enabling their freedom, their cre-

ativity, and the most positive aspects of their personality to flourish; at creating organic links between the individual and those around him, and between the group and society; at reconciling people with themselves and with nature. It thereby rejoins the most basic goals of the working class in its daily struggles against capitalist alienation. These are not aspirations about some hazy and distant future, but rather the content of tendencies existing and manifesting themselves today, both in revolutionary struggles and in everyday life. To understand this is to understand that, *for the worker, the ultimate problem of history is an everyday problem*. To grasp this is also to perceive that socialism is not 'nationalization' or 'planning' or even an 'increase in the standard of living.' It is to understand that the real crisis of capitalism is not due to 'the anarchy of the market' or to 'overproduction' or to 'the falling rate of profit.' Indeed, it is to see the tasks of revolutionary theory and the function of the revolutionary organization in an entirely new way. Pushed to their ultimate consequences, grasped in their full strength, these ideas transform our vision of society and the world. They modify our conception of theory as well as of revolutionary practice" (*The Castoriadis Reader,* 51; emphasis in the original). As a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie for a brief period during 1960–61, Situationist International founder Guy Debord was certainly familiar with the contents of this key programmatic text, which accords a positive centrality to everyday life and struggle.

61. A translation (by John Fullerton and Paul Sieveking) of this celebrated text, the counterpart to Debord's *The Society of the Spectacle* (also from 1967), is now available online, for example, at http://www.scenewash.org/lobbies/chainthinker/situationist/vaneigem/rel/roel.html, which is where I found this and the following Vaneigem quotations.

62. The following Vaneigem quotation from *The Revolution of Everyday Life* allows us to gauge the full distance between that book and Augoyard's *Step by Step: Everyday Walks in a French Urban Housing Project:* "The revolution of everyday life will blot out ideas of justice, punishment and torture, which are notions dependent on exchange and fragmentation. We don't want to be judges, but, by destroying slavery, masters without slaves recovering a new innocence and gracefulness in living. We have to destroy the enemy, not judge him. Whenever Durruti's column freed a village, they would assemble the peasants, ask which were the Fascists and shoot them on the spot. The next revolution will do the same. With perfect composure. We know there'll be no-one to judge us, nor will there ever be judges again, because we will have gobbled them up." Here we see what can result when someone else's "everyday lived experience" is fetishized into an excuse for not thinking on one's own and for not exercising responsible judgment.

63. A point Augoyard reiterated to me several times.